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THE 1950 AMENDMENT TO THE PREFERENCE
SECTION OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT
AND MARYLAND LAWt
By BRIDGEwATER M. ARNOiL*
The primary purpose of this article is to make the at-
tempt, perhaps hazardous for the author, to see how
amended Sec. 60a of the Bankruptcy Act should be ap-
plied to various types of property transfers in Maryland
under applicable Maryland law. At the time this article
is being written only one case2 has come to the writer's
attention which involves the amended Section 60a of the
Bankruptcy Act, and applicable Maryland law. Another
case involves the Uniform Trust Receipts Act enacted in
Virginia. As Maryland also has the Uniform Trust Re-
ceipts Act, this case likewise is available for guidance.3
This means, of course, that much that is written here is
an attempt to speculate as to probable future rulings with-
out the comforting buttress of decided cases.
t All references to the Maryland Code In this Article and footnotes are
to Flack's Annotated Code of Maryland, 1951, unless otherwise specified,
and are hereinafter cited only by Article and Section number. References
to the Bankruptcy Act will be to the Section number only of the Bankruptcy
Act only, but the first time a citation thereof appears in a footnote, the
corresponding United States Code Annotated citation will be given, for the
convenience of the reader.
* A.B., 1923, Princeton University; LL.B., 1931, University of Maryland.
Assistant Dean and Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of
Law.
111 U. S. C. A. (1953 Cum. Supp.), Sec. 96.
2In re Burton, 120 F. Supp. 148 (D. C. Md., 1954), conditional sales.
a In re Harvey Distributing Co., 88 F. Supp. 466 (D.C. E.D. Va., 1950)
and on appeal Coin Machine Acceptance Corp. v. O'Donnell, 192 F. 2d 773
(4th Cir., 1951). For a case construing Sec. 0a and applicable Arkansas
law see In re Watson, 99 F. Supp. 49 (D.C. W.D., Ark., 1951).
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On March 18, 1950, Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act,
dealing with preferences to creditors voidable in bank-
ruptcy, was amended. The effect of this amendment was
to establish new tests as to when a transfer became per-
fected for purposes of Section 60 and, it might be added
parenthetically, for purposes of the second act of bank-
ruptcy in Section 3.4 The 1950 amendment to Section 60 is
roughly about twelve times as long as the prior statutory
material which it replaced and, the author dares predict,
likewise about twelve times as complicated to one reading
'it. This is not said in any spirit of criticism of the 1950
amendment because it seems quite apparent that the
groups which labored to work out a solution to a difficult
problem, - which necessarily involves many types of prop-
erty transfers and applicable, but varied, recording stat-
utes, - have sought to reach a balanced, workable and fair
result."
It is not the purpose of this article to review the amend-
ments to Section 60 since 1898 and the construction of these
amendments by the courts.' Suffice it to say, that Con-
gress in the 1938 revision of the Bankruptcy Act decided
to strike down the advantages given to certain creditors
claiming liens by virtue of the doctrine of relation back,
applied to so-called equitable liens exemplified by Sexton
v. Kessler7 and "pocket liens" as exemplified by Carey v.
Donahue.8 These advantages were necessarily at the ex-
pense of general creditors who frequently were unaware,
until their debtor was in bankruptcy, that certain assets
were, without any notoriety, already dedicated to certain
creditors.
'11 U. S. C. A. (1953 Cum. Supp.), Sec. 21.
5 See A Propo8al to Amend Section 60a of the BankruptcV Act, by J.
Francis Ireton, A 6 Corporate Reorganization Combined with American
Bankruptcy Review 257 (1947), for an enlightening discussion of the prob-
lem of preference and an analysis of an earlier proposed draft of a fairly
similar amendment to Section 60a.
I For this information, see 3 CoLIER ON BANKRUPTOY (14th Ed., 1953),
877 et 8eq., and Kupfer, The Recent Amendment of Section 60a of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, 24 J. Nat'l Assn. of Referees In Bankruptcy 86 (1950).
7225 U. S. 90 (1912).
8 240 U. S. 430 (1916).
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To do this, Congress in 1938 amended Section 60a to
read as follows: 9
"A preference is a transfer, as defined in this title,
of any of the property of a debtor to or for the benefit
of a creditor for or on account of an antecedent debt,
made or suffered by such debtor while insolvent and
within four months before the filing by or against
him of the petition in bankruptcy, or of the original
petition under Chapters 10, 11, 12, or 13 of this Title,
the effect of which transfer will be to enable such
creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than
some other creditor of the same class. For the pur-
poses of subdivisions a and b of this section, a trans-
fer shall be deemed to have been made at the time
when it became so far perfected that no bona-fide pur-
chaser from the debtor and no creditor could there-
after have acquired any rights in the property so trans-
ferred superior to the rights of the transferee therein,
and, if such transfer is not so perfected prior to the
filing of the petition in bankruptcy or of the original
petition under Chapters 10, 11, 12, or 13 of this title,
it shall be deemed to have been made immediately be-
fore bankruptcy."
The language in italics was known as the "bona-fide
purchaser for value" test of perfecting transfers to credi-
tors.
Then came the Klauder case"° decided on March 8, 1943.
In this case a bank made advances to a company secured
by the company making a concurrent assignment of ac-
counts receivable to the bank. An involuntary petition in
bankruptcy was filed against the company on April 18,
1940 and it was subsequently adjudged bankrupt. At the
time of bankruptcy the company was indebted to the bank
for loans so made on contemporary assignments of accounts
receivable as security between January 19, 1940 and April
5, 1940. No notice of the assignments had been given to
the debtors of the company whose obligations had been
taken as security. Because of this omission the trustee in
011 U. S. C. A. (1943), Sec. 96(a). Italics supplied.10 Corn Exchange Bank v. Klauder, 318 U. S. 434 (1943).
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bankruptcy challenged the bank's right to the benefit of
the security on the grounds it was a voidable preference
under Sec. 60, in that, the assignments had not been per-
fected under the law of Pennsylvania, which was the ap-
plicable state law, against a subsequent good-faith assignee
for value. The court held the assignments were voidable
preferences and that the trustee was entitled to the funds.
The Court said:
"This is undoubtedly the effect of a literal reading
of the Act. Its apparent command is to test the effec-
tiveness of a transfer, as against the trustee, by the
standards which applicable state law would enforce
against a good-faith purchaser. Only when such a pur-
chaser is precluded from obtaining superior rights is
the trustee so precluded. So long as the transaction
is left open to possible intervening rights to such a
purchaser, it is vulnerable to the intervening bank-
ruptcy. By thus postponing the effective time of the
transfer, the debt, which is effective when actually
made, will be made antecedent to the delayed effec-
tive date of the transfer and therefore will be made a
preferential transfer in law, although in fact made
concurrently with the advance of money. In this case
the transfers, good between the parties, had never been
perfected as against good-faith purchasers by notice to
the debtors as the law required, and so the conclusion
follows from this reading of the Act that the petition-
ers lose their security under the preference provision
of Sec. 60(b)."I'
Inasmuch as Maryland had the same common law rule
as Pennsylvania requiring notification of the debtor in
order to be protected against a subsequent bona fide as-
signee, 2 the Maryland General Assembly enacted, as emer-
gency legislation, within less than two months after the
Klauder case was decided, Article 8, Section 21 to validate
assignments of accounts receivable against third parties
without notification of the debtor. Also, some apprehen-
sion developed as to whether or not companies extending
- Ibid, 436-7.
1Lambert v. Morgan, 110 Md. 1, 72 A. 407 (1909).
1Md. Laws (1943), Ch. 728, approved May 4, 1943.
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credit on trust receipt financing could ever protect them-
selves in the event of the debtor's bankruptcy despite full
compliance with the notoriety provisions of The Uniform
Trust Receipts Act. 4 These apprehensions were confirmed
by In re Harvey Distributing Company.5 On appeal from
this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit6 indicated doubts as to the validity of the Dis-
trict Court's ruling under the 1938 amendment but found
it unnecessary to pass upon the question since the 1950
amendment took effect while the case was pending and
the United States Court of Appeals decided that the 1950
amendment was applicable, it being practical to apply it as
provided in Section 4b of the amendment. This Section
provided:
"Effect of This Amendatory Act -. . . b. The pro-
visions of this amendatory Act shall govern proceed-
ings so far as practicable and applicable in cases pend-
ing when it takes effect; ...
In the statement of "Purposes of the Bill" containing
the 1950 amendment to Sec. 60a, it is stated among other
things:
"The resultant confusion has cast grave doubt upon
the validity of normal business security, in all of the
areas covered by trust receipts, factors liens, oil leases,
cattle loans, airplane-equipment financing, chattel
mortgages, assignments of accounts receivable, condi-
tional sales agreements for resale, etc. Indeed, a bank
officer, who appeared as one of the witnesses at the
subcommittee hearing, testified that the situation had
come to such a pass that his institution was compelled
to regard all such types of transaction as unsecured
loans, and to rule on them, as to the terms which his
bank was willing to enter into them, accordingly.' 18
' 'Art. 951/ ; See 10 Md. L. Rev. 285, 287 (1949).
Supra, n. 3.
16 Coin Machine Acceptance Corp. v. O'Donnell, et al., supra, n. 3.
17 Public Law 461, 81st Congress, Ch. 70 - 2nd Session; see also "Sick
Sixty", 33 Cornell L. J. 99 (1947).
"United States Code Congressional Service - 81st Congress - Second
Session 1950, 1987.
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This all led up to the enactment of the 1950 amendment
to Sec. 60a. 19
SSec. 60:
"a. (1) A preference is a transfer, as defined In this Act, of any of
the property of a debtor to or for the benefit of a creditor for or on
account of an antecedent debt, made or suffered by such debtor while
insolvent and within four months before the filing by or against him
of the petition initiating a proceeding under this Act, the effect of
which transfer will be to enable such creditor to obtain a greater per-
centage of his debt than some other creditor of the same class.
"(2) For the purposes of subdivisions a and b of this section, a
transfer of property other than real property shall be deemed to have
been made or suffered at the time when it became so far perfected
that no subsequent lien upon such property obtainable by legal or
equitable proceedings on a simple contract could become superior to
the rights of the transferee. A transfer of real property shall be
deemed to have been made or suffered when it became so far perfected
that no subsequent bona fide purchase from the debtor could create
rights in such property superior to the rights of the transferee. If
any transfer of real property Is not so perfected against a bona fide
purchase, or if any transfer of other property is not so perfected against
such liens 'by legal or equitable proceedings prior ito the filing of a
petition initiating a proceeding under this Act, It shall be deemed to
have been made immediately before the filing of the petition.
"(3) The provisions of paragraph (2) shall apply whether or not
there are or were creditors who might have obtained such liens upon
the property other than real property transferred and whether or not
there are or were persons who might have become bona fide puchasers
of such real property.
"(4) A lien obtainable by legal or equitable proceedings upon a
simple contract within the meaning of paragraph (2) is a lien arising
in ordinary course of such proceedings upon the entry or docketing of
a judgment or decree, or upon attachment, garnishment, execution, or
like process, whether before, upon, or after Judgment or decree and
whether before or upon levy. It does not include liens which under
applicable law are given a special priority over other liens which are
prior in time.
"(5) A lien obtainable by legal or equitable proceedings could be-
come superior to the rights of a transferee or a purchase could create
rights superior 'to the rights of a transferee within the meaning of
paragraph (2), if such consequences would follow only from the lien
or purchase itself, or from such lien or purchase followed by any step
wholly within the control of the respective lien holder or purchaser,
with or without the aid of ministerial action by public officials. Such
a lien could not, however, become so superior and such a purchase
could not create such superior rights for the purposes of paragraph (2)
through any acts subsequent to the obtaining of such a lien or subse-
quent to such a purchase which require the agreement or concurrence
of any third party or which require any further judicial action,
or ruling.
"(6) The recognition of equitable liens where available means of
perfecting legal liens have not been employed is hereby declared to be
contrary to the policy of this section. If a transfer is for security and
if (A) applicable law requires a signed and delivered writing, or a
delivery of possession, or a filing or recording, or other like overt
action as a condition to its full validity against third persons other
than a buyer in the ordinary course of trade claiming through or
under the transferor and (B) such overt action has not been taken,
and (C) such transfer results in the acquisition of only an equitable
lien, then such transfer is not perfected within the meaning of para-
1954] BANKRUPTCY-SEC. 60a AMENDED, 1950 317
It will be noted that this amendment establishes two
tests ° as to when a transfer is perfected. This is done by
dividing property into two classifications and applying
separate tests for each classification. The two classifica-
tions are: (1) Real Property; (2) Property Other Than
Real Property.21
(1) The test for when a transfer of Real Property is
perfected is the so-called "bona-fide purchaser for value"
graph (2). Notwithstanding the first sentence of paragraph (2), it
shall not suffice to perfect a transfer which creates an equitable lien
such as is described in the first sentence of paragraph (6), that it is
made for a valuable consideration and that both parties intend to
perfect it and that they take action sufficient to effect a transfer as
against liens by legal or equitable proceedings on a simple contract:
Provided, however, That where the debtor's own interest is only
equitable, he can perfect a transfer thereof by any means appropriate
fully to transfer an interest of that character: And provided further,
That nothing in paragraph (6) shall be construed to be contrary to
the provisions of paragraph (7).
"(7) Any provision in this subdivision a to the contrary notwith-
standing if the applicable law requires a transfer of property other
than real property for or on account of a new and contemporaneous
consideration to be perfected by recording, delivery, or otherwise, In
order that no lien described in paragraph (2) could become superior
to the rights of the transferee therein, or if the applicable law requires
a transfer or real property for such a consideration to be so perfected
in order that no bona fide purchase from the debtor could create rights
In such property superior to the rights of the transferee, the time of
transfer shall be determined by the following rules:
"I. Where (A) the applicable law specifies a stated period of
time of not more than twenty-one days after the transfer within
which recording, delivery, or some other act is required, and com-
pliance therewith is had within such stated period of time; or
where (B) the applicable law specifies no such stated period of
time or where such stated period of time is more than twenty-one
days, and compliance therewith is had within twenty-one days
after the transfer, the transfer shall be deemed to be made or
suffered at the time of the transfer.
"II. Where compliance with the law applicable to the transfer
is not had in accordance with the provisions of subparagraph I, the
transfer shall be deemed to be made or suffered at the time of com-
pliance therewith, and if such compliance is not had prior to the
filing of the petition initiating a proceeding under this Act, such
transfer shall be deemed to have been made or suffered immediately
before the filing of such petition.
"(8) If no such requirement of applicable law specified In paragraph
(7) exists, a transfer wholly or In part, for or on account of a new
and contemporaneous consideration shall, to the extent of such con-
sideration and interest thereon and the other obligations of the trans-
feror connected therewith, be deemed to be made or suffered at the
time of the transfer. A transfer to secure a future loan, if such a loan
Is actually made, or a transfer which becomes security for a future
loan, shall have the same effect as a transfer for or on account of a
new and contemporaneous consideration."
2 As will appear later on in this article there is a slightly different test
for equitable liens, infra, p. 343.
1 Sec. 60a (2).
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test. This is substantially the same test that appeared in
the 1938 amendment.22
(2) The test for when a transfer of Property Other Than
Real Property is perfected is the so-called "lien creditor"
test.23 This is defined in Sec. 60a(4) to mean:
"A lien obtainable by legal or equitable proceed-
ings upon a simple contract within the meaning of
paragraph (2) is a lien arising in ordinary course of
such proceedings upon the entry or docketing of ajudgment or decree, or upon attachment, garnishment,
execution, or the like process, whether before, upon, or
after judgment or decree and whether before or upon
levy. It does not include liens which under applicable
law are given a special priority over other liens which
are prior in time."'24
Some examples of when one would thus obtain a lien by
legal proceedings would be the lien one obtains by placing
the writ of fieri facias in the sheriff's hands or laying a
writ of attachment on a judgment.2 5
Unless a shorter period is established by applicable law,
Sec. 60a (7)I(A) gives the transferee a period of grace of
twenty-one days after the day of actual transfer for a
contemporaneous consideration to do the necessary acts
to perfect it, such as recording. If this is done, then the
transfer is regarded as being made at the time it was
actually made, that is, the transferee gets the benefit of
relation back and the consideration for the transfer is not
regarded as an antecedent debt. If state law sets no spe-
cial time or a time longer than the twenty-one day period,
Sec. 60a (7)I(B) still requires the perfecting to be done
within the twenty-one day period of grace.
It is conceivable that the term "applicable law" in Sec.
60a as such could be construed to mean not only State law
but also some Federal statute which might be involved
because of the nature of the property transfered.16 How-
- 11 U. S. C. A. (1943), Sec. 96.
Sec. 60a (2).
,Note also further limitations prescribed by paragraph (5).
15 Prentiss Co. v. Whitman & Barnes Co., 88 Md. 240, 41 A. 49 (1898).
6As for erample, the Ship Mortgage Act, 46 U. S. C. A. (1944), Ch. 25,
Secs. 911, et 8eq.: Civil Aeronautics Act, 49 U. S. C. A. (1951), Sec. 523.
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ever, in the "Purposes of the Bill", no reference in this
connection is made to Federal law but only to State law.
In the statement of the objectives of the bill it is said:
".... to provide that no transfer made in good faith,
for a new present consideration, shall constitute a
preference to the extent of such consideration actually
advanced, if the provisions of applicable State law
governing the perfection of such transfer are com-
plied with, with an appropriately rigid time limitation
(twenty-one days) for such perfection if such limita-
tion is not itself prescribed by the applicable State
law.,2 7
It might be noted as regards corporate receiverships,
Article 23, Section 77(b) provides:
"All preferences, payments and transfers made by
the corporation, which would be void or fraudulent
under the provisions of the insolvency laws of this
State if made by a natural person or under the acts
of the Congress of the United States relating to bank-
ruptcy, shall to like extent be fraudulent and void..
Hence, if this provision is a valid one,8 Section 60 of
the Bankruptcy Act is not only of importance in bank-
ruptcy proceedings, including corporate reorganizations un-
der the Bankruptcy Act, but also in corporate receiverships
in which a receiver is appointed pursuant to Article 23.
Most of the problems that hereafter will be discussed
would appear to be capable of solution by using the pat-
tern set out below. In the pattern we have (1) a transfer
for a contemporaneous consideration perfected within the
grace period and (2) a transfer for a contemporaneous con-
sideration perfected beyond the grace period, this latter
fact causing the consideration to become an antecedent
debt.
27 United States Code Congressional Service - 81st Congress - Second
Session 1950, 1988; See also COLIM ON BANKRUPTCY (14th Ed., 1953),
Par. 60.39, 912.
2'There may be some question whether or not this statute goes so far
as to infringe upon the paramount power of Congress to enact bankruptcy
legislation. International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U. S. 261 (1929).
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End of 21 day grace
Date of period for perfecting
Actual Transfer under Sec. 60.*
Date
Perfected
(1)
Debt Is Still relation back
Contemporaneous r
Date
Perfected
(2)
Debt Has Become
Antecedent
* Unless Maryland statute
specifies a shorter period
of time for perfecting.
PERSONAL PROPERTY
Pledge of Personal Property. No recording is required
for a pledge of personal property. That delivery to the
pledgee is required to perfect it as against "lien creditors"
appears to be the common law. In the case of a pledge
that comes within the purview of Article 95 , Sections 3
and 15,29 the pledgee for "new value" is protected for ten
Sec. 3 of Art. 95 , provides:
"(Attempted Creation or Continuance of Pledge Without Delivery or
Retention of Possession) :
(1) An attempted pledge or agreement to pledge not accompanied
by delivery of possession, which does not fulfill requirements of a trust
receipt transaction, shall be valid as against creditors of the pledgor
only as follows:
(a) to the extent that new value is given by the pledgee in
reliance thereon, such pledge or agreement to pledge shall be valid
as against all creditors with or without notice, for ten days from
the time the new value is given;
(b) to the extent that the value given by the pledgee is not new
value, and in the case of new value after the lapse of ten days
from the giving thereof, the pledge shall have validity as against
lien creditors without notice, who become such as prescribed in
Section 8, only as of the time the pledgee takes possession, and
without relation back.
(2) Purchasers (including entrusters) for value and without notice
of the pledgee's interest shall take free of any such pledge or agreement
to pledge unless, prior to the purchase, it has been perfected by posses-
sion taken.
(3) Where, under circumstances not constituting a trust receipt
transaction, a person, for a temporary and limited purpose, delivers
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days from the time new value is given even though he
does not take delivery as against "lien creditors. '8 0 Ap-
plicable law therefore, setting a period of time of less than
twenty-one days, the transfer should be perfected within
the shorter period of time set by Article 95 , Section 3V1
Hence, if money is advanced or new credit given on Octo-
ber 1st and the creditor takes delivery of the pledge as
security therefore on or before October 11th, the transfer
should be treated as if it were made on October 1st and is
for a present consideration. However, if the pledgee does
not take possession until October 12th, the ten-day grace
period having elapsed, the transfer should be treated as
made on October 12th and the obligation incurred on Octo-
ber 1st becomes an antecedent debt and, the other ele-
ments of a voidable preference being present under Sec-
tion 60a and b, the trustee in bankruptcy may set it aside.
As to a pledge not within the purview of Article 95 ,
Sections 3 and 15, the common law rule apparently is that
it is good, if the pledgee takes delivery any time before
there is a "lien creditor",s2 No special time limit being set
under such applicable law, Sec. 60a(7)I(B) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act allows a grace period of twenty-one days for
perfecting the pledge by delivery. That being the case,
if the loan or new credit is given on October 1st and the
pledgee takes possession on October 22nd - "within 21
days after," the transfer should be treated as made on
October 1st for a present consideration. However, if the
pledgee does not take possession until October 23rd, the
'twenty-one day grace period having elapsed, the transfer
should be deemed to be made on October 23rd and the
goods, documents, or instruments, in which he holds a pledgee's or
other security interest, to the person holding the beneficial Interest
therein, the transaction has like effect with a purported pledge for
new value under this section."
Sec. 15 exempts from the Article various personal (non-professional) trans-
actions, 1933 Handbook of the Natl. Conference of Comm'r's. on Uniform
State Laws & Proceedings, 250.
W For the definition of "new value" and "lien creditor" see Art. 952,
Sec. 1.
$'Sec. 60a (7) 1(A).
BnowN ON PERSONAL PROPERTY (1936), 573; HANNA AND MACLACHLAN,
CASES o CREDTons' RIGHTS (4th Ed., 1949), Vol. 1, 123; In re Consorto
Const. Co., 212 F. 2d 676 (3rd Cir., 1954); In re P. J. Sullivan Co., 247
F. 139 (D.C. N.D. N.Y., 1918).
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obligation incurred on October 1st would become an ante-
cedent debt.
Field Warehousing. Somewhat related to the idea of a
pledge is the use of field warehousing as a security device.
In these transactions arrangements are made whereby a
warehouse is set up on or near the debtor's premises,
usually by the debtor leasing the "warehouse premises"
to a corporation perhaps specially created to own and oper-
ate the warehouse. The premises to be used as the ware-
house are marked off with appropriate signs to give notice
to the public that the premises are a warehouse. As the
debtor acquires goods to be used in his business they are
placed in the warehouse as bailee and warehouse receipts
are issued by the warehouse. These warehouse receipts
are then delivered to the creditor who holds them as se-
curity for his loan or loans to the debtor. Assuming the
warehousing arrangement is sufficiently set up to meet
court approval, it would seem that the security the creditor
receives is the warehouse receipt. The debtor is pledging
the warehouse receipt with the creditor as security.3 This
transaction might come under the provisions of Article
952, Section 3. Hence it would seem the same result would
follow as described above involving pledges. Thus if the
new value is given by the creditor on October 1st the docu-
ment,3" i.e., the warehouse receipt, should be delivered
to the creditor on or before October 11th to be perfected
within the ten day grace period and get the benefit of rela-
tion back so that the present consideration on October 1st
does not become an antecedent debt.
If the field warehouse is considered as owned and oper-
ated directly by the creditor, then the delivery of the
goods themselves to the warehouse would be the delivery
which would perfect the pledge and it would seem the
problem should once again be determined under the pro-
vision of Article 95 , Section 3 as the applicable law with
the ten day grace period. In a case of this type, a court,
if it is not satisfied with the manner in which the ware-
house has been set up and marked and the goods segre-
"Friedman, Field Warehousing, 42 Col. L. Rev. 991, 1012 (1942).
"For the definition of "document" see Art. 95Y2, Sec. 1.
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gated from the debtor's possession, may decide there has
never been a delivery of possession of the pledge to the
creditor and invalidate the security interest of the credi-
tor.8
5
Factor's Lien. A factor's lien agreement created under
the provisions of Article 2, Sections 21-27 is required to
be recorded within fifteen days after the execution of the
written agreement. 6 If recorded within this time, the
factor's lien is effective as against all claims of creditors
of the borrower from the time of recording except certain
statutory lien creditors specified in Section 24. Applicable
law, therefore, setting a period of time of less than twenty-
one days, the transfer should be perfected within the
shorter period of time set by Article 2, Section 23.87 Hence.
it would seem that if the agreement is executed on Octo-
ber 1st for a contemporaneous consideration it must be
recorded on or before October 16th to keep the present
consideration on October 1st from becoming an antecedent
debt.
At this point it might be noted that Article 2, Section 22
appears to permit the lien to stand as security for future
advances which the factor may make after the execution
of the agreement. The lien for these future advances
should be protected so far as Section 60 is concerned by
virtue of the last sentence in Section 60a(8) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act.
A more difficult problem that may arise grows out of
the fact that the Factor's Lien Act seems to permit after-
acquired property of the borrower to become subject to
the factor's lien."8 Suppose a factor's lien agreement is
executed on October 1st covering present inventory and
also such goods as the borrower may acquire in the future.
The agreement is recorded within fifteen days as required
by Article 2, Sections 23 and 24. On October 25th the bor-
In re Spanish American Cork Products Co., 2 F. 2d 203 (4th Cir., 1924).
For a detailed article on "field warehousing" see Friedman, Field Ware-
housing, 8upra. n. 33. See also BIRNBAUM, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER
THE UNIF0BM COMMERCIAL CODE, (American Law Institute, 1954), 133
and Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, (1952), Secs. 7-205(2), 9-305(2).
Art. 2, Secs. 23, 24.
T Sec. 60a (7) 1(A).
MArt. 2, Secs. 22, 23(c).
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rower acquires additional goods which, under the terms
of the agreement, become additional security for the loan
of October 1st. Will this be regarded as merely an equi-
table charge which at best might become a legal lien on
October 25th? If so, paragraph (6) would seem to be the
pertinent part of Sec. 60a of the Bankruptcy Act on this
problem. While there may be some question as to the
legislative wisdom of enacting a statute which permits
a creditor by appropriate language in the agreement to
blanket under his lien such property as his debtor may
acquire in the future from persons other than the secured
creditor himself, it is not the purpose of this article to
go into the pros and cons of this problem. 9 The Mary-
land Factor's Lien law seems to permit this and protect
the factor who properly records against all third persons
except possibly the purchaser in the ordinary course of
business from the borrower. Accordingly, although not
free from doubt, it would seem that a lien on the property
acquired by the borrower on October 25th should not be
invalidated as a preference. Sec. 60a(6) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act says in part:
"The recognition of equitable liens where avail-
able means of perfecting legal liens have not been em-
ployed is hereby declared to be contrary to the policy
of this section. If a transfer is for security and if (A)
applicable law requires a signed and delivered writing,
or a delivery of possession, or a filing or recording, or
other like overt action as a condition to its full validity
against third persons other than the buyer in the ordi-
nary course of trade claiming through or under the
transferor and (B) such overt action has not been
taken, and (C) such transfer results in the acquisition
of only an equitable lien, then such transfer is not
perfected within the meaning of paragraph (2). .. ."
While it may seem difficult to visualize a legal or even
an equitable lien between October 1st and October 25th
on non-existent property of the borrower, there would seem
See Cohen and Gerber, The After-Acquired Property Clause, 87 Univ.
of Pa. L. Rev. 635 (1939).
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to be legislative sanction 0 for an advanced charge on such
property for the benefit of the factor against all persons,
except possibly a purchaser in the ordinary course of trade,
where appropriate notoriety has been given by proper re-
cording and the necessary "overt action" taken, thus elimi-
nating the invalidating element (B) in the Act. Also, it
is to be noted that because of timely recording there is no
secrecy at the expense of third persons and the transaction
does not come within one of the underlying policies of
Section 60a of the Bankruptcy Act of striking down secret
liens. If such a lien is valid, then the trustee in bank-
ruptcy acquires title to the bankrupt assets subject to
liens which are valid under applicable state law, including
liens on after acquired property.41
Another possible solution, but probably a very doubtful
one, to this whole problem of after-acquired property is
to take the view that where the state legislature author-
izes by statute the creation of a lien on after-acquired
property, it should be treated as a statutory lien and, if
compliance is had with the requirements of the statute,
it is protected under the provisions of Sec. 67b42 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act. This section provides:
"The provisions of Sec. 60 of this Act to the con-
trary notwithstanding, statutory liens in favor of em-
ployees, contractors, mechanics, landlords, or other
classes of persons . ..created or recognized by the
laws of the United States or of any State, may be valid
against the trustee, even though arising or perfected
while the debtor is insolvent and within four months
prior to the filing of the petition initiating a proceed-
ing under this Act by or against him."
The question is: Is this a statutory lien in favor of "other
classes of persons"? Is a factor included in "classes of per-
'
0 Art. 2, Sec. 23(c) :
". .. Such lien shall be valid from the time of such recording,
whether such merchandise shall be in existence at the time of the
execution of the written agreement creating the lien or shall come into
existence subsequently thereto, or shall subsequently thereto be acquired
by the borrower .... "
"Pearson v. Rapstine, 203 F. 2d 313 (5th Cir., 1953) ; Mason v. Citizens
Nat. Trust & Savings Bank, 71 F. 2d 246 (9th Cir., 1934); BIRNBAUM,
SECuRED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, supra, n. 35,
103, 104.
'
2 11 U. S. C. A. (1953), Sec. 107(b).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
sons"?4" A broad construction might include a factor, but it
seems doubtful.
Bill of Sale. Where a bill of sale is executed in a sales
transaction 4" and the vendor remains in possession of the
chattel, Article 21, Section 49 provides that no property
shall pass as against creditors who acquire a lien by judicial
proceedings on such personal property unless recorded as
therein provided. Article 21, Section 53 provides that bills
of sale must be recorded within the county where the
vendor resides within twenty days from the date hereof. We
assume that this means that the vendee has twenty days to
record, exclusive of the date of the bill of sale. If recorded
within this time the vendee should be protected against
intervening "lien creditors."4 5 Here it would seem that if
the execution date of the bill of sale is October 1st it must
be recorded on or before October 21st to keep the present
consideration on October 1st from becoming an antecedent
debt.46 There may appear to be a problem as to whether
or not a vendee who takes a bill of sale of goods for a pres-
ent consideration but fails to record the bill of sale could
be deemed a creditor of the vendor. This problem also
arises in the case of a sale of land and will be discussed
later in connection with the sale of land.4"
If the bill of sale is used as a vehicle for a mortgage
probably the same result would follow, as Article 21, Sec-
tion 54 provides that a mortgage of personal property shall
be executed, acknowledged and recorded as are bills of
sale, which would seem to make Article 21, Section 53 ap-
"3 See McLaughlin, Aspects of the Chandler Bill to Amend the Bankruptcy
Act, 4 Univ. of Chicago L. Rev. 369, 395 (1937); White v. Karl Kiefer
Machine Co., 127 F. 2d 119 (8th Cir., 1942).
"Not as a vehicle for a chattel mortgage.
" Referring to Art. 24, Secs. 39 and 46, Code of 1860 (Flack's Code [1951],
Art. 21, Sees. 49 and 53) in Kreuzer v. Cooney, 45 Md. 582, 591 (1877), the
court says:
"By having the conveyance recorded within the time prescribed by
the statute, the title of the grantee, though the grantor still retains
possession, is as perfect, and is protected as effectually as if the sale
had been accompanied by delivery."
If this is true as to subsequent purchasers, it should also be true as against
"lien creditors".
" Kreuzer v. Cooney, ibid; Dorsey v. Smithson, 6 H. & J. 61 (1823);
Clary v. Frayer, 8 G. & J. 398 (1837).
"Infra, p. 335.
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plicable. If a petition in bankruptcy, however, were filed
before the recording other problems could arise under the
fraud provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, particularly Sec-
tions 70e and 70c,48 the "strong arm" clause.49
Chattel Mortgage. Article 21, Section 49 provides that
no personal property whereof the mortgagor shall remain
in possession shall pass as against creditors who acquire a
lien by judicial proceedings on such personal property un-
less recorded as therein provided. Article 21, Section 56
provides that a mortgage of personal property shall be
valid and take effect, except as between the parties hereto,
only from the time of recording. Relying on this statute,
the Court of Appeals of Maryland in a case where a chattel
mortgage was executed on October 3rd, a garageman ob-
tained a garageman's lien on October 6th, and the chattel
mortgage was recorded on October 14th, ruled that the
garageman's lien was superior to the chattel mortgage.
The Court said, ". . . in Maryland at least, a chattel mort-
gage, unlike a mortgage of real estate, takes effect, except
as between the parties, only from the time of recording
... M' In view of Article 21, Section 49 and the language
in this case it would seem that a "creditor who obtains a
lien through judicial proceedings" before a chattel mort-
gage is recorded would prevail over the chattel mortgagee
despite the fact that the mortgage is recorded within the
twenty day period. No particular period of time is given
by Section 56 in which the recording is to be made. Hence,
up to this point, under Sec. 60a(7)I of the Bankruptcy
Act it would seem that the recording should be made with-
in twenty-one days after the date of transfer as in the case
of conditional sales of chattels discussed below. However,
Article 21, Section 53 provides that bills of sale must be
recorded within twenty days from the date thereof. Arti-
cle 21, Section 54 says that a mortgage of personal property
shall be recorded as bills of sale. This may well mean that
a chattel mortgage likewise must be recorded within
,811 U. S. C. A. (1953), Sec. 110(e) and (c).
"1 See In re Cook, 9 F. Supp. 764 (D.C. Md., 1935).
5Baltimore Bankers Corp. v. Peters, etc., 193 Md. 655, 658, 69 A. 2d 491
(1949).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
twenty days.5 1 Assuming this to be a correct analysis,
there would be only a twenty day period of grace instead
of twenty-one days, so that if the mortgage is executed on
October 1st it should be recorded on or before October
21st to keep the present consideration from becoming an
antecedent debt. Here, also, if the petition in bankruptcy
is filed before the recording other problems could rise
under the fraud provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, par-
ticularly Sections 70e and 70c.
Except for mortgages given to certain specified mort-
gagees as provided in Article 21, Sections 60-73 inclusive,
and in the cases of certain corporate mortgagors52 and per-
haps mortgages of future crops,5 3 it seems that Maryland
does not generally give validity to mortgages of after-
acquired property.54 The whole question of the validity
of mortgages of after-acquired property, including future
crops, does not appear to be too clear and settled in Mary-
land and could easily warrant a special article written on
this subject alone. Other jurisdictions also have their diffi-
culties with this problem.55 It is possible that if the court
will hold that there is an equitable lien or charge and the
mortgage is properly recorded within the time required
by Section 60a of the Bankruptcy Act, such a mortgage of
after-acquired property will be protected. This result
might be worked out under the case of In re Cook.5 On
the other hand, if we take the language used in Grimes v.
Clark,57 there would be no lien on the after-acquired prop-
5Gill v. Griffith, 2 Md. Ch. 270 (1848).
5Butler v. Rahm, 46 Md. 541 (1877); Brady v. Johnson and others,
Trustees, 75 Md. 445, 26 A. 49 (1892) ; Diggs v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 112
Md. 50, 75 A. 517 (1910).
In re Cook, 8upra, n. 49, relying on G. Ober & Sons v. Keating, 77 Md.
100, 26 A. 501 (1893), which established an equitable lien.
6, First National Bank v. Lindenstruth, 79 Md. 136, 28 A. 807 (1894);
Clark v. Grimes, 232 F. 190 (D.C. Md., 1916), aff'd. 234 F. 604 (4th Cir.,
1916), where, under a recorded mortgage of a future stock of goods, the
mortgagee subsequently took possession of after-acquired goods shortly
before the mortgagor's bankruptcy, the court held the mortgagee received
a preference.
5See Cohen land Gerber, The After-Acquired Property Clause, 87 Univ.
of Pa. L. Rev. 635 (1939).
"Supra, n. 49.
"Supra, n. 54, 234 F. 604, 608, where a recorded mortgage of after-
acquired property, was involved:
"Nor on the whole are we persuaded that the equities of Grimes"
(the mortgagee) "are superior to those of other creditors. He was
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erty and recordation would give it no validity as against
third persons. In this situation, there is no transfer of the
after-acquired property at the time the consideration is
given and any subsequent act by the mortgagee to perfect
the transfer by taking possession or receiving a supple-
mental mortgage would be a transfer for an antecedent
debt and, other necessary elements being present, should
be set aside as a preference.""
Conditional Sale of Chattel. Article 21, Section 74
provides that every note, sale or contract for the sale of
goods and chattels, or of any item of furnishing or equip-
ment which is affixed to real property, wherein the title
thereto, or a lien thereon, is reserved until the same be
paid in whole or in part, or the transfer of title is made
to depend upon any condition therein expressed and pos-
session is to be delivered to the vendee, shall, in respect to
such reservation and condition, be void as to creditors who
acquire without notice a lien by judicial proceedings on
such goods or chattels, or in case of any item affixed to
real property on such real property, until such note, sale
or contract be in writing, signed by the vendee and be
recorded."'
No particular period of time is given as to when the
recording is to be made. Hence, under Section 60a(7)I
of the Bankruptcy Act the recording should be made with-
in twenty-one days after the date of the delivery to the
vendee. So, if the article is delivered to the vendee on
October 1st, the conditional sale should be recorded on or
before October 22nd to keep the present consideration from
becoming an antecedent debt. Here, also, if a petition in
bankrupcty is filed before the recording, other problems
bound to know that under Maryland law his mortgage would not be
a lien upon or give him any right to seize the goods afterwards pur-
chased by Baker; and dealers who sold to Baker on credit were pre-
sumably aware that the supplies they furnished would not be subject
to Grimes' mortgage."
MFor a discussion of this problem see CozmEn oN BANKRuarCY (14th
Ed., 1953), par. 60.50, 972.
"Also in regard to conditional sales it should be noted that the Bank-
ruptcy Act, Sec. 1(30), 11 U. S. C. A. (1953 Cure. Supp.), Sec. 1(30),
provides:
".. . the retention of a security title to property delivered to a
debtor shall be deemed a transfer suffered by such debtor."
329
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could arise under the fraud provisions of the Bankruptcy
Act, particularly Sections 70e and 70c.60
Trust Receipt. The Uniform Trust Receipts Act6 pro-
vides that the entruster's security interest in goods, docu-
ments or instruments under the written terms of a trust
receipt transaction, shall without any filing of a statement
of trust receipt financing be valid as against all creditors
of the trustee, with or without notice, for thirty days after
delivery of the goods, documents or instruments to the
trustee, etc. Article 95 , Section 8 further provides that
the entruster's security interest shall be void as against
"lien creditors, ' 62 that is, creditors who have a lien through
judicial proceedings, who become such after such thirty
day period and without notice of such security interest
and before filing. Article 95 , Section 13 provides for the
filing with the State Tax Commission of a "Statement of
Trust Receipt Financing" in reference to goods and docu-
ments. No such filing is apparently required with refer-
ence to instruments8 in trust receipt transactions but it
would appear that the same results will follow as to in-
struments as they would to goods and documents, in view
of the thirty day grace period given to all three types of
security interest. It would seem that as no provision is
made for public notoriety in the case of instruments, if the
entruster is to be protected against "lien creditors" after
the thirty day period, he would have to take possession
of the instruments from the trustee.
Section 60a(7)I of the Bankruptcy Act provides that
where the applicable law specifies a period of time of more
than twenty-one days, and compliance therewith is had
within twenty-one days after the transfer, the transfer
shall be deemed to be made at the time of the transfer.
Here then, is a situation where the entruster, although he
complies with state law, may run afoul of Section 60a of
"For an enlightening pioneer opinion by Chief Judge William C. Cole-
man of the United States District Court for Maryland construing the 1950
amendment to Section 60a of the Bankruptcy Act in conjunction with the
Maryland conditional sale recording statute, see In re Burton, 120 F. Supp.
148 (D.C. Md., 1954).
61 Art. 95/2, Sec. 8.
2For ithe definition of "lien creditor", see Art. 95 , Sec. 1.
"For the definition of "instruments" see ibid.
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the Bankruptcy Act because the grace period allowed by
Section 60a(7)I(B) is less than that permitted by the ap-
plicable Maryland statute. If the trust receipt transaction
occurs on October 1st and the entruster in the case of goods
and documents files a statement with the State Tax Com-
mission on or before October 22nd, the transfer should be
treated as if it were made on October 1st and for a present
consideration. However, if the entruster does not file until
October 23rd, the twenty-one day grace period having
elapsed, the transfer should be deemed made on October
23rd and the obligation incurred on October 1st is treated
as an antecedent debt. Apparently in the case of instru-
ments, where there is no provision for filing, the entruster
should take possession on or before October 22nd.
The filing of a "Statement of Trust Receipt Financing"
gives the required notoriety and is valid for a period of one
year."4 Under the Uniform Trust Receipts Act65 the filing
of the statement of trust receipt financing in the State Tax
Commission Office does not of itself create a security in-
terest in the entruster. It is necessary that a trust receipt
itself must be executed covering the particular entrusted
goods.66 The purpose of the filing is merely to give notice
of possible trust receipt transactions and it is not neces-
sary that the trust receipt itself be filed.67 Hence, if a
statement is filed on October 1st and a trust receipt is
executed for a present granting of credit on November 1st
it would seem that under Section 60a of the Bankruptcy
Act the trust receipt lien should be valid even though it is
on property acquired subsequent to the filing of the state-
ment of trust receipt financing with the State Tax Com-
mission. In other words, the notoriety obtained by filing
on October 1st should be adequate to cover future acquired
property.
Consignment. Ordinarily a consignment is nothing more
than a bailment for sale but with no obligation on the con-
" Art. 95%, Sec. 13(4).
" Art. 95.
"In re Yost, 107 F. Supp. 432 (D.C. Md., 1952, Chesnut, J.).
In re Nickulas, 117 F. Supp. 590 (D.C. Md., 1954), aff'd., Tatelbaum v.
Refrigeration Discount Corp., 212 F. 2d 877 (4th Cir., 1954).
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signee to purchase. 8 Title to the goods remains in the con-
signor even though possession is in the consignee. As no
debtor-creditor relation exists between the consignee and
the consignor there is normally no basis for a preferential
transfer within the confines of Section 60 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act. However, Maryland enacted Article 2, Sec-
tions 18-20 inclusive, in 1922. These sections provide that
any person engaged in any mercantile, trading or manu-
facturing business as agent shall, prior to commencing
such business, file in the clerk's office a certificate in writ-
ing under oath, disclosing the true name and address of
the principal, etc. This certificate is to be recorded in the
"Agency Record." If any person conducting such busi-
ness as agent shall fail to file the certificate, any creditor
of such person has the right to sue and upon obtaining
judgment all the goods, etc. used or acquired in said busi-
ness shall be liable to seizure and sale under execution in
satisfaction of the judgment.
Considering the fact that these sections have been in
the Code for over thirty years, there is a surprising paucity
of decisions construing them and whether or not they apply
to the consignor-consignee relationship still seems to be
a question.69
If these statutes do apply to consignments and there
has been a failure to comply with the recording provision
1 In re Sachs, 31 F. 2d 799, 800 (D.C. Md., 1929).
"In re Eichengreen, 18 F. 2d 101 (D.C. Md., 1927), a manufacturer
shipped shoes to a dealer under a written agreement which was not re-
corded. Upon the dealer's bankruptcy, the manufacturer sought to reclaim
the shoes, which were over 50% of the dealers stock, contending the written
agreement was a consignment agreement. The Court held the agreement
appeared to be a conditional sale agreement and, not being recorded, the
manufacturer could not reclaim the shoes. The court said, however, that
if the agreement was a consignment as contended by the manufacturer, the
manufacturer still could not reclaim the shoes because of the failure to file
a certificate under the Factors Act, Art. 2. On appeal it was decided in
Reliance Shoe Co. v. Manly, 25 F. 2d 381 (4th Cir., 1929), that the agree-
ment was a conditional sale contract and therefore it was unnecessary to
decide whether the Maryland statute in regari to agents and factors
would apply to this case. Subsequently, in In re Sachs, supra, n, 68, an
owner intrusted two cars to the bankrupt for purpose of sale, the bank-
rupt to keep all the proceeds above a certain price. The Trustee in bank-
ruptcy claimed the funds representing the two cars. The court held that
the cars were held on consignment and considered Art. 2, Sec. 18, but
decided that Art. 2, Sec. 9, appeared to expressly exempt from the opera-
tion of Art. 2, Secs. 18-20, goods consigned as were the two cars in this
case. See also In re Nickulas, 8upra, n. 67.
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it would seem that if the consignee goes into bankruptcy
the consigned goods in his possession at the time would
pass to the trustee in bankruptcy by virtue of the fraud
provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, particularly Section 70
a, c, e.7° Whether or not, Article 2, Sections 18-20 inclusive,
could change the consignor-consignee relationship suf-
ficiently to create a creditor-debtor relationship that might
make Sec. 60 of the Bankruptcy Act operative is problem-
atical, but there may be such a possibility.71
Assignment of Accounts Receivable. Article 8, Sec-
tion 2 provides that all written assignments and all writ-
ten assignments in the nature of a pledge, of accounts re-
ceivable and amounts due or to become due on open ac-
counts or contracts shall be valid and legal and shall pass
the title of such accounts receivable to the assignee with-
out the necessity of notice to the debtor and the transfer
of the title shall take effect and be valid and enforceable
against all persons as of the date thereof. There is no fur-
ther act required such as recording or book-marking.
This being so, Section 60a(8) of the Bankruptcy Act
provides, that if there is no requirement of applicable law
requiring perfecting by recording, delivery or otherwise
as specified in Sec. 60a (7), a transfer for or on account of
a new and contemporaneous consideration shall be deemed
to be made at the time of the transfer. Therefore, if there
is a written assignment of accounts receivable on October
1st, it would seem that the transfer takes place on October
1st, and, if it is for a present consideration, no problem
of it becoming an antecedent debt would be involved.
There might be a question here as to whether or not the
Maryland statute implies that there must be a delivery of
a written assignment to the assignee. If so, it is possible
the twenty-one day grace period for such delivery would
be applied.
A problem arises as to an assignment of future ac-
counts. This conceivably creates only an equitable charge
As to the possibility of fraud as to subsequent creditors in principal-
agent relationship see Albert v. Lindau, 46 Md. 334, 346 (1877).
See COULun ON BANKRUPTOY (14th Ed., 1953), par. 60.44, 948.
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on the future accounts72 and, if that is all, would probably
be struck down under the provision of Section 60a(6) of
the Bankruptcy Act as merely an equitable lien which could
be perfected into a legal lien only by a subsequent assign-
ment when the accounts become extant. However, the
"applicable law" of Maryland78 appears to protect such an
assignment even against a bona-fide purchaser for value.
The statutory language is:
".*. All written assignments . . . of accounts re-
ceivable and amounts due or to become due ... shall
be valid . . . and the transfer of the title shall take
effect and be valid and enforcible (sic) against all
persons as of the date thereof..."
Accordingly, it would seem that an assignment of future
accounts receivable for a contemporaneous consideration
should not be invalidated as preferences under Section 60
of the Bankruptcy Act.
REAL PROPERTY
It will be recalled that the 1950 Amendment to Section
60a of the Bankruptcy Act adopts the "bona-fide purchaser
for value" test of perfecting a transfer where real property
is involved.
Sale of Real Property. Deeds of real property must be
recorded as provided in Article 21, Section 1 (1954 Supp.)
and Article 21, Section 21 provides that where there are
two or more deeds conveying the same lands or chattels
real, the deed or deeds which shall be first recorded ac-
cording to law shall be preferred, if made bona-fide and
upon good and valuable consideration. This section is
made applicable to all deeds of mortgage, and to all other
deeds or conveyances to the validity of which recording
is necessary.
The statute sets no specific period of time within which
to record.74 Section 60a (7)I(B) of the Bankruptcy Act
provides that where applicable law provides no stated
'2Page, Latent Equitie8 in Maryland, 1 Md. L. Rev. 1, 28 (1936).
Art. 8, Sec. 2.
"Art. 21, Sec. 24.
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period of time for recording there is a twenty-one day
period of grace after the transfer for perfecting it.
Hence, if a deed is executed on October 1st for a present
consideration and is recorded on or before October 22nd,
the transfer should be treated as if it were made on Octo-
ber 1st and is for a present consideration. However, if
the deed is not recorded until October 23rd, the twenty-
one day grace period having elapsed, the transfer should
be deemed to be made on October 23rd, and the obligation
incurred on October 1st becomes an antecedent debt.
Whether or not a vendee of real estate who paid con-
temporaneous value could be regarded as a "creditor" may
possibly seem debatable. To be a "creditor" the vendee
would have to have a claim provable in bankruptcy.75 If
the vendor has already delivered a deed to the vendee and
the latter has withheld it from record it may be a little
difficult to see how the vendee could have a claim provable
in bankruptcy. However, a creditor paid off in full prior
to his debtor's bankruptcy may still be a creditor having
a claim provable in bankruptcy if he is deprived of the
transfer which gave him a preference." It is quite possible
to reason that the grantor of real property, having been
paid for the real property, is in the position of a debtor to
the grantee until the real property is transferred. Al-
though personal property was involved, the case of Stieff
v. Wilson77 may help to illustrate the method by which
the vendor becomes the debtor of the vendee. In that
case in December, 1924, vendor sold an H-Model piano to
vendee, the piano to be delivered in June, 1925, which was
not done. However, subsequently the vendor acquired an
L-Model piano under a conditional sale contract from X.
Vendor delivered the L-Model piano to vendee which was
accepted by vendee in fulfilment of the December, 1924
contract. The conditional sale contract under which the
vendor acquired the L-Model piano was not recorded. X
sought to replevin the L-Model piano from the vendee.
The court in protecting the vendee as a bona-fide purchaser
" For the definition of "creditor", see Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 1 (11).
" Sec. 57(g), 11 U. S. C. A. (1943), Sec. 93(g).
151 Md. 597, 135 A. 407 (1926).
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for value who purchased without notice of X's unrecorded
reservation of title said:
"A purchaser who receives delivery in compliance
with an antecedent payment seems, in principle, to
be in exactly the situation of a creditor who takes the
chattel in satisfaction of an antecedent debt or pre-
existing claim. '78
Also, an eminent authority, Collier on Bankruptcy, 79 says:
"A transfer made for a consideration contem-
poraneous with its execution, but perfected later, will
likewise be judged as of the later date (when the con-
sideration had become an antecedent debt) unless the
delay in recording was not more than the time allowed
by Sec. 60a (7) as a grace period ... Thus it can be seen
that Sec. 60a puts a premium on prompt performance
of whatever act is necessary under local law to per-
fect a transfer of real property good against the
world."
Accordingly, if a vendee purchases real estate, and pays
a present consideration for it but does not record the deed
until after the twenty-one day grace period, then in the
event the vendee had reason to believe his vendor was
insolvent when he actually did record, and a petition in
bankruptcy is filed within four months of the recording, it
would seem that the trustee could set aside the transfer
as a preference under Sections 60a and b of the Bankruptcy
Act. It is presumed that the vendee could file a claim in
bankruptcy as a general creditor for the consideration
paid.80
Mortgage of Real Property. Mortgages of real property
and deeds of trust in the nature of a mortgage must be re-
corded as provided by Article 21, Section 1 (1954 Supp.),l
and mortgages must be recorded within six months 2 from
their date. Recording within the six months period will
Is Ibid, 602.
(14th Ed., 1953), par. 60.41, 925, 928.
8 Such a transaction in Maryland probably could not be avoided by the
trustee under Sec. 70 of ,the Bankruptcy Act and the "strongarm clause",
because of Cramer v. Roderick, 128 Md. 422, 98 A. 42 (1916) ; see also
Caltrider v. Caples, 160 Md. 392, 153 A. 445 (1931).
See Art. 21, Sec. 37.
Art. 21, Sec. 18.
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protect the mortgagee against the rights of intervening
creditors during this period13 but not against the rights
of an intervening bona-fide purchaser for value. Article
21, Section 21, providing that where there are two or
more deeds conveying the same lands or chattels real, the
deed or deeds which shall be first recorded according to
law shall be preferred, if made bona-fide and upon good
and valuable consideration, is likewise applicable to deeds
of mortgage. Although courts and statutes at times treat
a mortgage of real estate as if it were personal property,8 4
the author assumes that for purposes of Section 60a of the
Bankruptcy Act it will be regarded as a transfer of real
property. Treating, then, such a mortgage as being a
transfer of an interest in real property, under the provi-
sions of Section 60a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act, the "bona-
fide purchaser for value" test of perfection is required. As
no particular period of grace is given as to bona-fide pur-
chaser for value by Article 21, Section 21, the mortgagee
under Section 60a (7)I(B) of the Bankruptcy Act should
have a twenty-one day period of grace for perfecting his
transfer. Hence, if the mortgage of real estate is executed
on October 1st it should be recorded on or before October
22nd to get the benefit of the relation back. If not recorded
until after October 22nd then the mortgagee should lose
the benefit of relation back and the present consideration
given for the mortgage on October 1st should be treated
as an antecedent debt when the mortgage was recorded
after October 22nd and, other elements of a voidable pref-
erence being present, the transfer should be avoided by
the trustee in bankruptcy.
Mortgages to secure future advances 8 apparently would
be governed by the same rule as ordinary mortgages 6 for
purposes of Section 60a of the Bankruptcy Act with the
twenty-one day period of grace for perfecting by record-
ing. Section 60a (8) of the Bankruptcy Act provides:
8, Knell v. Green St. Build. Assn., 34 Md. 67 (1871).
84Art. 66, Sec. 20; Sumwalt v. Tucker, 34 Md. 89 (1871).
"Art. 66, Secs. 2, 3. See Watkins, Maryland Mortgages for Future
Advances, 4 Md. L. Rev. 111 (1940).
1 Art. 21, Secs. 1, 21.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
"... A transfer to secure a future loan, if such a
loan is actually made, or a transfer which becomes
security for a future loan, shall have the same effect
as a transfer for or on account of a new and contempo-
raneous consideration."
An assignment of a mortgage of real estate for a term
of more than seven years, if not recorded is invalid to pass
the legal title."" As no particular time is stipulated for the
recording of the assignment it would appear that there
should be a twenty-one day grace period as in the case of
recording the original mortgage itself.""
An interesting question for speculation is whether or
not a release of a mortgage could become involved in the
problem of a preference in bankruptcy. The effect of the
release is to transfer the record title of the real estate back
to the mortgagor, assuming it has not been done by opera-
tion of the defeasance clause in the mortgage by payment
on the due day.89 If the mortgagor does not have the re-
lease recorded and the mortgagee goes into bankruptcy,
will the courts work out a theory that the mortgagee is in
the position of a debtor to the mortgagor until the title is
transferred back to the mortgagor? It may be that a pref-
erence might be worked out somewhat analagous to the
way it could be worked out in the vendor-vendee relation-
ship when the vendee fails to record the deed within the
time required, as suggested above. If this be so, as no par-
ticular time is required for recording a release of a mort-
gage it would seem that the period of grace would be
twenty-one days; hence, if the mortgage is paid off on
October 1st the release should be recorded on or before
October 22nd. However, this being a release of a mortgage
on real property the question arises, even assuming that
the release is regarded as a transfer of an interest in real
M8 Lester v. Hardesty, 29 Md. 50 (1868) ; Art. 21, Sees. 1, 40, 41.
Supra, p. 337. Although it is possible that Art. 8, Sec. 2, may be appli-
cable to the assignment of a mortgage, the author believes it is highly
doubtful if this section of the Code is applicable to the transfer of the
security, although it may have application to the money due on the theory
that it is an assignment of the amounts due or to become due on a contract.
U See WATsn oN MORTGAGES (1934), 170. See Brown v. Stewart, 56 Md.
421 (1881) ; Howard v. Hobbs, 125 Md. 636, 645, 94 A. 318 (1915).
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property 0 and would have to be perfected so that it could
not be defeated by a bona-fide purchaser for value, is it
possible to have a bona-fide purchaser for value under
these circumstances? The only transfer that the holder
of the mortgage not released of record could make would
be to assign the mortgage to a third person for value. But
such an assignee as against the mortgagor is not protected
as is the ordinary bona-fide purchaser for value. The Court
of Appeals of Maryland has said:
"The assignee of a mortgage does not stand in the
position of a purchaser without notice, as against the
mortgagor, and those claiming under him, notwith-
standing the assignment may have been taken with-
out notice of the defenses against the enforcement of
the mortgage. The transfer of a mortgage is so far
within the rule which applies to other choses in action,
that where the assignment is made without the con-
currence of the mortgagor, as in this case, the assignee
takes the mortgage, and the debts secured by it, upon
the same terms, and subject to the like equities and
defenses that it was subject to in the hands of the
assignor. The mortgagor cannot be prejudiced by the
assignment; and the recording Acts made no differ-
ence.. 91
Also the Court of Appeals of Maryland has stated:
"But here, the mortgage having been satisfied be-
fore the day of payment, and there being, conse-
quently, no forfeiture, by the express terms of the con-
dition, the mortgage ceased to be operative, and is de-
clared to be void. In such case, according to all the
authorities, the land returns to the mortgagor, with-
out any re-conveyance or release, by the simple oper-
ation of the condition, free and clear of the mortgage
... And, according to our decisions,... substantially
the same result follows, whether the payment or
0 Apparently in Maryland if a mortgage debt is satisfied, either before or
after default, the mortgage is discharged although failure to release the
mortgage of record may leave a cloud upon the mortgagor's title. James
Morgan's Lessee v. Davis, 2 H. & McH. 9 (1781) ; Brown v. Stewart, ibid;
Dentzel v. City & S. Ry. Co., 90 Md. 434, 45 A. 201 (1900).
n Cumb. Coal & Iron Co. v. Parish, 42 Md. 598, 614 (1875). See also
Central Bank v. Copeland, 18 Md. 305 (1862) ; Hunter v. Chase, 144 Md. 13,
123 A. 393 (1923).
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satisfaction be before or after the day of payment fixed
by the mortgage. It is the full satisfaction that oper-
ates to extinguish the mortgage title.""2
While failure to record the release might be misleading
to creditors of the mortgagee in that he might appear to
have an ostensible asset, which in fact he does not have,
it would seem that the trustee should not be able to re-
cover the property under the theory of preference.
PrTION IN BANKRUPTCY FiLED BEFoRE
TERMINATION OF "GRAcCE PERIOD"
If no "perfecting" of the transfer is done at all either
within the necessary time to get relation back or tardily so
there is no relation back, Section 60a(7)II of the Bank-
ruptcy Act provides that such transfer shall be deemed to
have been made or suffered immediately before the filing
of the petition.
This raises an interesting question: What happens if the
petition in bankruptcy is filed before the grace period for
perfecting a transfer has expired? For example: A land
mortgage is executed on October Ist and under our analysis
of the applicable law the mortgagee has until October 22nd
to record in order to keep the present consideration on
October 1st from becoming an antecedent debt. But be-
fore he records, the petition in bankruptcy is filed on Octo-
ber 10th. Will the courts say that the transfer is made im-
mediately before the filing of the petition on October 10th,
thus making the consideration given on October 1st an
antecedent debt, or will the courts give the creditor the
benefit of relation back without recording, or will the
creditor still be given time to perfect by recording after
the petition in bankruptcy?
It is obvious that the intervening petition'in bankruptcy
has cut into the grace period which it is the policy of Sec-
tion 60 to grant a creditor who has given a contempo-
raneous consideration. It does not seem proper that the
creditor under these circumstances should be penalized
if the grace period has not elapsed prior to the filing of
12 Brown v. Stewart, 8upra, n. 90, 430.
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the petition. One solution might be to interpret the last
sentence of Section 60a (2)98 with Section 60a (7) II9 to
mean that the transfer is perfected on October 10th just
before the petition is filed and, this being within the grace
period, relation back should be allowed so as to treat the
transfer as if it were perfected on October 1st. In other
words, under the circumstances, construe the word "made"
to mean "perfected" and then take the view that the trans-
fer was perfected within the required time. Another solu-
tion to this problem, suggested by an outstanding author-
ity9 5 is for the creditor to record within the grace period
even though after the petition in bankruptcy has been
filed, and treat it as perfected within the statutory grace
period. Or it is possible that a court might take the view
that the transfer was made on October 10th immediately
before the petition was filed, and that there having been
no actual recording at this time there is no "perfecting"
and no relation back, so that therefore the consideration
given on October 1st has become an antecedent debt on
October 10th. This last construction in the opinion of the
writer of this article would be a rather harsh and drastic
application of Section 60a.
In this connection, it should be noted that although
the courts may decide to give a creditor the benefit of the
"grace period" where there is an intervening petition in
bankruptcy during the "grace period" for purposes of
Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, there may be situations
where the creditor will still lose his security because of the
provisions of Section 70, particularly Sections 70e and 70c.
For example, a conditional sale contract is executed and
the vendee takes possession of the chattel on October 1st.
"If any transfer of real property is not so perfected against a bona
fide purchase, or if any transfer of other property is not so perfected
against such liens 'by legal or equitable proceedings prior to the filing
of a petition Initiating a proceeding under this Act, it shall be deemed
to have been made immediately before the filing of the petition."
" "Where compliance with the law applicable to the transfer is not had
in accordance with the provisions of subparagraph I, the transfer shall
be deemed to be made or suffered at the time of compliance therewith,
and if such compliance is not had prior to the filing of the petition
initiating a proceeding under this Act, such transfer shall be deemed
to have been made or suffered Immediately before the filing of such
petition."
5CoLnm oN BANKRUPTCY (14th Ed., 1953), par. 60.51, 982.
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Subsequently, on October 10th, a petition in bankruptcy
is filed by or against the vendee. On October 15th the
vendor records the conditional sales contract as provided
by Maryland law.96 No period of time being set by this
statute when recording must be made, under Section 60a
the vendor would have a twenty-one day period of grace,
or until October 22nd, in which to record and get the bene-
fit of relation back. However, under Article 21, Section 74
an unrecorded conditional sale contract is void as to credi-
tors who acquire without notice a lien by judicial proceed-
ings on such chattel. Section 70e(1) of the Bankruptcy
Act provides that:
"A transfer made or suffered or obligation incurred
by a debtor adjudged a bankrupt under this Act which,
under any Federal or State law applicable thereto, is
fraudulent as against or voidable for any other rea-
son by any creditor of the debtor, having a claim prov-
able under this Act, shall be null and void as against
the trustee of such debtor."
Although there may be no actual "lien creditor" at the
time the petition in bankruptcy is filed as required by
Maryland law to defeat the unrecorded conditional sale,
nevertheless, the Bankruptcy Act in Section 70c,97 the so-
called "strong arm" clause, supplies the judicial lien by
stating that the trustee, as to all property, (of the bankrupt
at the date of bankruptcy) whether or not coming into
possession or control of the court,... shall be deemed vested
as of (the date of bankruptcy) with all the rights, remedies,
and powers of a creditor then holding a lien thereon by
(legal or equitable proceedings), whether or not such a
creditor actually exists. So, in the example given, although
the trustee in bankruptcy might not be able to pick up the
marbles as a preference under Sec. 60 it would appear that
he could do so under Sec. 70 of the Bankruptcy Act.9
' Art. 21, Sec. 74.
1 1950 Amendment. Parenthetical material supplied.
If the petition in bankruptcy is filed before the grace period expires,
the trustee in bankruptcy probably could not take advantage of the strong-
arm clause because under Maryland law protection appears to be afforded
against "lien creditors" during the grace period in the following situations:
trust receipt transactions, Art. 951/2, Sec. 8; pledges and field warehousing,
Art. 95 , Sec. 3; unrecorded bill of sale in sales transaction, Art. 21,
Sec. 53, Kreuzer v. Cooney, 45 Md. 582 (1877) ; unrecorded deed of real
[VOL. XIV
1954] BANKRUPTCY-SEC. 60a AMENDED, 1950 343
EQUITABLE LIENS
Section 60a(6) of the Bankruptcy Act opens with a
policy statement -
"The recognition of equitable liens where avail-
able means of perfecting legal liens have not been em-
ployed is hereby declared to be contrary to the policy
of this section" (and then continues) "If a transfer is
for security and if (A) applicable law requires a
signed and delivered writing, or a delivery of posses-
sion, or a filing or a recording, or other like overt action
as a condition to its full validity against third persons
other than a buyer in the ordinary course of trade
claiming through or under the transferor and (B)
such overt action has not been taken, and (C) such
transfer results in the acquisition of only an equitable
lien, then such transfer is not perfected within the
meaning of paragraph (2)."
This seems to clearly indicate that Congress does not
wish the courts to revert back to creating and protecting
equitable liens where it was possible to have perfected
them into legal liens, as was done in Sexton v. Kessler.9
It is also to be noted that the test of "perfecting" these
equitable liens is slightly different from the other tests
mentioned above. It is, in effect, the "bona-fide purchaser
for value" test, excepting a buyer in the ordinary course
of trade,10 and applies to both real property and property
other than real property. However, if what apparently
would be vulnerable as an equitable lien for want of "per-
fecting" is perfected within the "grace period" provided
for by paragraph (7) of Section 60a, then it should not be
stricken down as an equitable lien because Section 60a (6)
provides ".... That nothing in paragraph (6) shall be con-
strued contrary to the provisions of paragraph (7)." An
illustration perhaps might be a pledge of goods governed
by the provisions of Article 95 , Section 3. On October
estate, Cramer v. Roderick, 128 Md. 422, 98 A. 42 (1916); Caltrider v.
Oaples, 160 Md. 392, 153 A. 445 (1931) ; unrecorded mortgage of real estate,
Knell v. Green St. Build. Assn., 34 Md. 67 (1871).
10225 U. S. 90 (1912).
The influence of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act which protects pur-
chasers in the ordinary course of trade regardless of the notoriety of public
filing would seem to be present in this test.
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1st L lends B $1,000 and B promises to pledge certain goods
with L as security but fails to do so and a petition in bank-
ruptcy is filed against B on October 15th. This might cre-
ate an equitable lien in favor of L but as he had not per-
fected it as required by paragraph (6) by taking delivery
of possession before the petition, and the other elements
of a voidable preference being present, the trustee in bank-
ruptcy should be able to avoid the equitable lien.110 How-
ever, if B delivers the goods to L on or before October
11th then under applicable law10 2 it would be valid against
"lien creditors", having been perfected within the grace
period permitted by Section 60a (7) of the Bankruptcy Act.
On the other hand, if a debtor's own interest is only
equitable, he can make a valid transfer of such an interest
if care is taken to perfect such transfer by any means ap-
propriate fully to transfer an interest of that character
under applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Act.0 3 This
perhaps could be illustrated by the situation where a deb-
tor, owning a piece of real property in Maryland subject to
a first mortgage, executes a second mortgage on the debtor's
equity of redemption. The legal title to the land being in
the first mortgagee the debtor has only an equitable interest
in the land that he can transfer as security for the second
mortgage debt and the second mortgagee therefore can
receive only an equitable lien or equitable mortgage on the
property. Thus, in this illustration, if the debtor executes
and delivers a second mortgage to the second mortgagee on
October 1st for a contemporaneous loan and the mortgagee
records the mortgage deed on or before October 22nd, i.e.,
within the grace period, the second mortgagee, even though
he has only an equitable lien, should be protected under
the provisions of Sec. 60a(6) because the debtor can per-
fect a transfer by any means fully to transfer an interest
of that character.
In this situation the trustee might also prevail by virtue of Sec. 70 of
the Bankruptcy Act.
H2Art. 95%, Sec. 2.
10 60a (6) of the Bankruptcy Act.
.. . Provided, however, That where the debtor's own Interest is
only equitable, he can perfect a transfer thereof by any means appro-
priate fully to transfer an interest of that character ......
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THE FouR MONTHS PERIOD
One of the elements necessary to make a voidable
preference is that the transfer of the debtor's property
be made within four months before the filing of the peti-
tion in bankruptcy.0 4 Under the 1950 amendment to Sec-
tion 60a it appears that although a transfer of property
is made more than four months prior to the petition in
bankruptcy but is not perfected within the grace period
as required by Section 60a until a time within four months
of the petition in bankruptcy, such transfer may be deemed
to have been made within four months of bankruptcy
and, other requirements of a voidable preference being
present, may be set aside by the trustee in bankruptcy.
For example, a debtor transfers property to a creditor
as security for a new and contemporaneous consideration
on March 1st, and under applicable Maryland law and
Section 60a (7) of the Bankruptcy Act there is a grace
period of twenty-one days for perfecting the transfer by
recording. The creditor records the instrument on March
15th within the twenty-one day grace period. Debtor files
a petition in bankruptcy on July 10th. Measuring back four
months from July 10th would give us the date of March
10th, so that any transfers made to creditors on or after
March 10th, other necessary elements being present, might
be set aside as a preference. However, in this case the trans-
fer having been perfected by having the instrument re-
corded within the grace period, the creditor gets the benefit
of relation back and the transfer is deemed to be made on
March 1st, more than four months prior to the petition in
bankruptcy and could not be set aside as a voidable prefer-
ence by the trustee in bankruptcy. However, let us take
the same transaction except that the creditor records the
instrument on March 23rd. This recording, being after the
grace period of twenty-one days has elapsed, the creditor
does not get the benefit of relation back, and the transfer
is deemed to be made on March 23rd and the contemporane-
ous consideration given on March 1st has now the status
"Sec. 60a (1).
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of an antecedent debt. Accordingly, this transfer having
been made within the four months period prior to the peti-
tion in bankruptcy, other necessary elements being pres-
ent, could be avoided as a preference by the trustee in
bankruptcy.
Again take the same transaction, except that on March
1st the creditor takes the property as security for an antece-
debt, and not for a contemporaneous consideration, and he
records the instrument on March 9th. Under Section 60a (2)
the transfer is deemed to be made on March 9th and as the
four months period does not start running until March 10th,
this transfer should not be set aside as a preference. If,
however, this creditor did not record until March 15th, the
transfer would be deemed to have been made on March
15th, there being no grace period and relation back because
the security was given for an antecedent debt on March 1st
and not for a contemporaneous consideration. The grace
period and relation back rule under Sec. 60a applies only
when there was a contemporaneous consideration at the
inception of the transfer.10 5 This being the case, in this last
example, the transfer having taken place within the four
months period prior to the petition in bankruptcy, if the
other necessary elements of a voidable preference are pres-
ent, the trustee in bankruptcy could set aside this transfer
as provided in Sec. 60b of the Bankruptcy Act. Finally, in
this connection, it might be noted that if the creditor failed
to record the instrument at any time the transfer would be
deemed to have been made immediately before the filing
of the petition in bankruptcy which would, of course, be
within the four months period."'
CONCLUSION
The 1950 amendment to Section 60a of the Bankruptcy
Act is a highly technical piece of legislation which is com-
plicated by the fact that in its application it is also neces-
sary to look to "applicable law" which is normally the
1 Sec. 60a(7). See Cor um oN BANKRUPTCY (14th Ed., 1953), par. 60.39,
912.
2Se. 60a(2) and (7)11.
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statutory and case law of the particular state involved.
Except for a trust receipt transaction °7 and a conditional
sale transaction l s the writer has found no reported cases in
which have been involved the 1950 amendment to Section
60a and applicable Maryland law. This is not surprising, of
course, due to the comparatively recent enactment of the
amendment and also the relatively few bankruptcies giving
rise to opinions that have occurred during the fairly pros-
perous period between 1950 and the summer of 1954 when
this article was written. If there were more uniformity in
the recording statutes of Maryland the problem would be
somewhat simplified. For example, the author is not aware
of any reason today why bills of sale, chattel mortgages
and conditional sales contracts should have different rules
as to the time in which they should be recorded. Any his-
torical reasons why bills of sale and, presumably chattel
mortgages, shall be recorded within twenty days from the
date thereof, 9 with the ensuing confusion this causes as to
the rights of third persons, whereas no particular time is
set for recording conditional sale agreements, would seem
to have no validity today in an age of good roads and swift
and easy transportation. Except incidentally, no reference
has been made to the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code
because Maryland has not, up to the present time, enacted
this Code."0 If at some time in the future Maryland should
enact this Code then, of course, some of the material in this
article about property other than real property would be-
come obsolete."'
117 Coin Machine Acceptance Corp. v. O'Donnell, 192 F. 2d 773 (4th Cir.,
1951).18 In re Burton, 120 F. Supp. 148 (D.C. Md., 1954).
10 Art. 21, Secs. 53, 54.
110 At the time of this writing, 1954, only Pennsylvania has enacted the
Uniform Commercial Code.
I See BIRNBAUM, SEcuRED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE (American Law Institute, 1954), for a detailed discussion and
as a particular example, p. 121.
